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1 Introduction 
“Diamonds love Antwerp” – these three words constitute the present slogan of the Antwerp 
World Diamond Centre, the organisation concerned with the promotion of the diamond trade 
and industry in the Scheldt city and keeping the latter an important diamond hub in the age of 
globalisation with new diamond centres evolving especially in low-cost countries like China 
and Thailand (The New York Times, May 31 2005; EVEN-ZOHAR 2006, 371ff.). In fact, dia-
monds seem to have loved Antwerp even in the past as the city has been a major centre for 
trading and polishing the precious stones since the 15th century (WALGRAVE 1993, 37). De-
spite some ups and downs there had not been any interruption of the commercial activities in 
this sector until World War II reached Belgium and trading as well as processing diamonds 
gradually were discontinued (LAUREYS 2005, chapter 5f). Surprisingly, however, the Belgian 
diamond sector experienced a long-lasting boom after 1945, contributing significantly to the 
country’s economic power even though the former infrastructure had partly been taken away 
or destroyed, many workers had fled, been deported or killed and other diamond centres had 
evolved during the years of the German occupation (VAN DYCK 1989). Given these aspects, 
the paper on hand addresses the question whether the window of locational opportunity aris-
ing after the abrupt break of the trajectory was restricted by past structures that actually have 
favoured the re-emergence of the cluster at its former location. By doing so, two aspects of 
conceptual interest are concerned as well: On the one hand, evolutionary literature up to now 
has emphasised chance as the major determinant of the emergence of regional trajectories 
thereby neglecting the underlying social processes. Furthermore, due to the concentration on 
concepts like path-dependency and lock-in potential ruptures in the development of clusters 
were only seldom taken into account yet (BATHELT/BOGGS 2005; 2003).  
To address the mentioned issues the paper is structured as follows: First of all, the evolution 
of regional clusters will be discussed from a theoretical perspective. Though it will be stressed 
that the window of locational opportunity approach can be regarded as a sound theoretical 
basis for the explanation of the evolution of regional clusters (chapter 2), it will be highlighted 
that the concept tends to disregard strategic measures of actors trying to create a new trajec-
tory intentionally. As such purposeful action, however, is expected to play an important role 
when overcoming a (temporary) rupture of a development path this must be regarded as a 
shortcoming of the concept (chapter 3). Having outlined the research design and methodology 
(chapter 4) the trajectory of the diamond district in Antwerp will be reconstructed (chapter 5) 
with special attention being paid to the factors having brought about the break of the path 
(chapter 6). Moreover, it will be shown that the war years can be regarded as a stage of shift-
ing centres as they led to the development of new growth centres at different locations (chap-
ter 7). Finally, the re-emergence of the former cluster structures will be discussed as an out-
come of strategic actions and chance aspects, both of them limiting the degree of openness to 
the new window of locational opportunity (chapter 8). The article ends by summing up the 
most important results and shedding light on the need for further research (chapter 9). 
 
2 Clusters as an evolutionary phenomenon 
Whilst for long clusters were treated as quasi-stable entities showing certain positive impacts 
on their regional economic environment in terms of increase of local productivity, entrepre-
neurial activities and corporate innovativeness (COOKE 2001) with each of these aspects being 
analysed in a vast number of publications, recent research has shifted towards a more dy-
namic view allowing for clusters to underlie certain changes in the course of time (HENN 
2008; DALUM et al. 2005, 231). Amongst the different concepts dealing with cluster dynamics 
(e. g. cyclical approaches), evolutionary approaches recently have attracted most interest. His-
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torically, the evolutionary view is rooted in social sciences, in particular in evolutionary eco-
nomics. Still at an early point of development, this field is yet not characterised by a consis-
tent framework, but in fact combines a number of different approaches (SCHAMP 2002, 42) 
characterised both by their criticism of the neoclassical paradigm and by highlighting the rele-
vance of economic change over time. In this context special attention has been paid to the 
concept of path dependency with its earliest precursors to be found in the 19th century (MAR-
TIN/SUNLEY 2006, 3) and being re-introduced into modern economic thinking especially by 
the seminal works by DAVID (1985) and ARTHUR (1994). The key characteristic of a path-
dependent process is that its outcome arises from its own history. More generally the long-
term development of a system is considered to depend on its point of departure and interfer-
ences occurring during its history1 with even minor accidents assumed to exert great influence 
on the process.2 Referring this aspect to spatial issues, past technologies, organisational forms 
and schemes of interpretation have to be taken into account when trying to explain the evolu-
tion of locational patterns of an industry as these factors come to shape the present practices 
and actions of individuals and organisations along a certain regional development path (so-
called trajectory). Up to now, different approaches have been developed to address these as-
pects: Stochastic approaches (see for example ARTHUR 1994) seek to explain the evolution of 
industrial patterns on the basis of mathematical models (e. g. polya urn experiments). Consid-
ering several shortcomings of these approaches (for a criticism see BOSCHMA 2007; 
BATHELT/BOGGS 2005), however, a different concept has been able to attract much more in-
terest: The authors of the window of locational opportunity concept argue that new require-
ments cannot be met at any location for they are far too innovative and therefore yet have to 
be provided by the companies themselves. As there are no specific regions offering better 
conditions there is great freedom when choosing the location, usually referred to as “window 
of locational opportunity” (STORPER/WALKER 1989, 74). In a seminal refinement BOSCHMA 
(2007; 1997) suggests that industries do not really start from scratch but rather typically rely 
on certain generic factors a priori not being evenly spaced and therefore limiting the range of 
the window of locational opportunity. Accordingly, regions possessing these factors will, to a 
certain probability, contribute to the development of the said industry while in regions without 
them, development seems unlikely. However, this is not to imply, that the latter should be 
excluded from the analysis from the start: It can rather be assumed that these factors will de-
velop by-and-by. In general, it therefore cannot be predicted where an industry forms; it can 
only be stated that the more regions are endued with these generic factors the more the win-
dow of locational opportunity is open. 
Once established, the development of the sites will vary since only a few of them will be able 
to develop into growth centres. Others, however, will stagnate, grow only slowly or even de-
cline. In other words: By and by companies in certain locations gain competitive advantages 
over their competitors due to positive feedbacks. As soon as the latter exceed a certain thresh-
old, the window of locational opportunity closes (STORPER/WALKER 1989, 86ff.) and selec-
tive growth patterns dominate.3 Moreover, during their life-cycle most industries tend to es-
tablish remote locations (growth peripheries). Depending on whether this happens for reasons 
                                                 
1  A common and often cited example of the phenomenon of (technological) path-dependency illustrating it 
very well is the development of the typewriting keyboard (DAVID 1985): Although different studies showed 
that other keyboard arrangements proved more efficient, the QWERTY pattern established itself as the most 
common keyboard in the second half of the 19th century (GROTE 2004, 80ff.). 
2  Whether this implies, however, that the outcome of a path-dependent process can be inefficient is still under 
debate (see GROTE 2004, 84ff.). 
3  While STORPER/WALKER (1989, 86ff.) assign this selection process to economies of scale, an improving 
technological infrastructure, the migration of qualified labour and increasing investment in recent years a 
closer examination of institutions and learning processes was brought to the fore as highlighted in the knowl-
edge or learning-based cluster approach (WOLFE/GERTLER 2004, 1073; MASKELL 2001; MALM-
BERG/MASKELL 2002). 
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of expansion or cost reduction the former locations typically will be kept or closed. As an 
industrial development path finally comes to an end, a reorganisation of the respective indus-
try is likely to take place leading to new windows of locational opportunity which favour the 
dislocation of the incumbents (stage of shifting centres). Such a shift is likely to occur as a 
continuous reaction to structural (loss of importance of certain industries), endogenous (rigid 
structures within the cluster) or exogenous factors (changes on the demand side, technological 
advance; ISAKSEN 2003, 262), but also as a consequence of a sudden, unpredictable rupture of 
the trajectory. 
 
3 Strategic action and the re-emergence of regional clusters 
Though the window of locational opportunity approach focuses on the dynamics of regional 
clusters from an evolutionary perspective it does not explain where (and why) a cluster forms 
initially as several authors criticise (e. g. BATHELT/GLÜCKLER 2002, 208; MOßIG 2000, 45); it 
rather traces the development of the different sites to chance aspects. In principle the consid-
eration of chance clearly helps to avoid deterministic thinking when trying to understand the 
development of regional clusters. Furthermore, the emphasis of chance in the mentioned con-
cepts has contributed to understanding an important aspect of cluster evolution, namely that 
the latter should not be regarded as logical outcomes of purposeful processes (MENZEL 2008; 
see for example FELDMAN/FRANCIS 2004 or ORSENIGO 2001 for studies concerning the failed 
development of clusters). However, at the same time referring to chance as a crucial factor of 
the emergence of clusters bears several shortcomings: First, models referring to chance as the 
main explanatory factor in general tend to neglect “contextual and causal processes and fail to 
explain why some apparently trivial events in some places are selected and become signifi-
cant, whilst other similar chance events in other locations do not trigger the birth of new in-
dustrial trajectories” (MARTIN/SUNLEY 2006, 31). Second, chance does not constitute a basis 
for policy advices which is not unproblematic in a discipline increasingly aiming at shaping 
the policy debate (MENZEL 2008; MARTIN 2001). Third, when attributing the emergence of a 
cluster to chance a closer examination of the processes underlying its emergence is avoided 
resp. rendered impossible: The so-called “small events”, for example, are often regarded to be 
accidental while in fact they are a result of intentional action of single actors (SCHAMP 2000, 
43) embedded in a certain social and technological environment (MARTIN/SUNLEY 2006, 32). 
Against this background it seems necessary to analyse empirically whether the emergence of 
the path in question can be attributed to purposeful or strategic action of relevant individuals.4 
If so their actions and motives should be studied in more detail. 
With reference to the evolution of technological paths GARUD and KARNØE (2001) were the 
first to discuss the role of strategic action from a conceptual perspective. They argue that 
“path dependence assigns too much weight to history; it inadequately characterizes the fragil-
ity of any path as it is produced and reproduced through micro level practices where social 
rules and artefacts are enacted“ (p. 8). Based on this view, they developed the concept of path 
creation departing from the path dependency-perspective in two main aspects: On the one 
hand, the authors argue that “entrepreneurs meaningfully navigate a flow of events even as 
they constitute them … entrepreneurs attempt to shape paths in real time, by setting processes 
in motion that actively shape emerging social practices and artifacts, only some of which may 
result in the creation of a new technological field” (GARUD and KARNØE 2001, 3). On the 
other hand, they highlight the process of “mindful deviation” implying that entrepreneurs of-
ten have to change existing social practices, regulations or institutions. All in all, path creation 
thus highlights “the active role of the entrepreneur and the firm, for it is these actors that help 
                                                 
4  The notion here simply refers to any action in pursuit of an objective based on the conscious, rational calcula-
tion of likely actions of others. 
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shape the evolution of markets and the rules by which markets operate“ (STACK/GARTLAND 
2005, 421). Regarding the relation between both concepts, PUFFERT (2000) stresses that pur-
poseful action should not be regarded as an alternative to path-dependency, as the latter would 
make actors even more interested in starting a new path, based on their technologies and tech-
niques. Furthermore, according to MEYER/SCHUBERT (2007) the driving force behind emerg-
ing paths should be situated on a continuum between unplanned processes on the one hand 
and intentionally controlled action on the other hand. 
As the concept of path creation is introduced into geography, local actors (entrepreneurs, pol-
icy makers) (HASSINK 2007; MARTIN/SUNLEY 2006, 32) can be regarded as being able to ex-
ert influence on the emergence of development paths (for example by mobilising certain re-
sources). Following MARTIN/SUNLEY (2006, 32) two kinds of mindful deviation can be dis-
tinguished in this context: First, there is an incremental form of path creation, implying that 
actors actively search for new solutions, i. e. processes, products, technologies etc. Second, 
there may be “critical junctures and large-scale events or shocks“ (ibid.) making agents shape 
new strategies.  
While, in general, strategic action increasingly is taken into account (MENZEL 2008; MAR-
TIN/SUNLEY 2006) as an element of path emergence, it has only seldom been subject to em-
pirical analysis so far (see for example HASSINK 2007). Especially when referring to ruptures 
of cluster development caused, for instance, by wars, natural catastrophes or other historical 
events (PORTER 1990) with the cluster infrastructure being destroyed or the relevant actors 
intentionally or unintentionally hindered in carrying out their businesses it can be hypothe-
sised that strategic actions is of relevance: First, based on past experiences actors formerly 
associated to the sector might be willing to use their power to reinvent the cluster structures 
for different (e. g. individual) reasons. Second, if the sector once had performed well, regional 
policy might be interested in re-developing the sector thus providing an adequate support to 
get it going again as soon as possible. Third, depending on the kind and duration of the rup-
ture, some parts of a local knowledge base or infrastructure might still exist thus in principle 
facilitating a comparatively rapid growth of the sector. Given these aspects, it is assumed here 
that a (potential) window of locational opportunity occurring after a (short-term) rupture of a 
cluster trajectory is likely to be closed by strategic actions of the actors related to the former 
cluster trying to revive it. 
 
4 Research design and methodology 
To prove empirically whether this is the case the diamond district in Antwerp which has re-
emerged after a short-term rupture in World War II will be used as an example. Unlike the 
majority of empirical work on clusters the study primarily makes use of historical methods: In 
detail, one of the authors was able to conduct searches in 34 different archives (amongst them 
the Archives Nationales in France, the Bundesarchiv in Germany and the National Archives 
and Records Administration in the US) throughout the years 1997-2003 to analyse the devel-
opment of the diamond sector during the Nazi rule. The results of these inquiries also provide 
the basis for several publications (LAUREYS 2005; 2003a; 2003b). In addition, an in-depth 
study in the Antwerp City Archive (Stadsarchief Antwerpen) carried out in 2008 aimed at 
explaining the developments in the post-war era. More than 70.000 datasets of the registers 
van aankomst en vertrek (Registers of arrival and departure) covering the period 1948-1965 
were analysed to shed light on the immigration of diamond people who contributed to the 
stabilisation of the resuscitated district. In doing so, a total of 1.186 diamond people could be 
identified as having migrated to Antwerp in the above mentioned period. Furthermore, the 
archive was searched for files documenting the re-emergence of the local diamond industry. 
Relevant dossiers could not only be found in the modern archive (Modern Archief) but also in 
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the Camille Huysmans mayor office archives (both belonging to the Antwerp City Archive) 
where the correspondence of the former mayor of Antwerp can be found. Since Jews play an 
important role in the history of the district (see also chapter 5), it was important to consider 
their role during the rupture and the re-emergence of the structures as well. In this context the 
authors were kindly provided with a list of all registered Belgian Jews dated from 1940 as 
well as with the lists of deportation to the concentration camps by the Jewish Museum of De-
portation and Resistance in Mechelen. Given the kind permission of its owner, it was further-
more possible to make use of the Brachfeld Archive thus gaining valuable information on 
(the) Jews in the diamond trade. Finally, important insights into the rebuilding of the Jewisch 
community also could be gained by several interviews with (former) diamantaires from Ant-
werp. 
 
5 The trajectory of the diamond district until 1940 
The history of the diamond sector in Antwerp dates back to the 15th century (WALGRAVE 
1993, 37). The reasons for the location of the diamond trade in this harbour are to be found in 
an early chapter of globalisation: In the 14th century, Bruges traded Indian diamonds with 
Venice. With the Portuguese taking over the trade routes however, Venice was replaced by 
Lisbon as the main European trade centre. And as Bruges’ sea access silted up in the course of 
the 16th century, the trade between the emerging commercial centre Antwerp and Lisbon 
started to rule out the connection Venice-Bruges. While for long the economic activities in the 
sector remained on a comparatively low level, the discovery of South-African diamond de-
posits in the 19th century provoked a massive influx of rough diamonds allowing for the em-
ployment of thousands of workers. Later, a significant strengthening of the institutional basis 
set in: Between 1887 and 1907 three unions were founded as a reaction to a rapid price col-
lapse which had resulted in high unemployment rates in the sector. As a countermeasure the 
“Syndicate of the Belgian diamond industry” (Syndicaat der Belgische Diamantnijverheid), 
an employers’ federation, was established in 1927. Moreover, the Diamantclub (established in 
1893), the Beurs voor Diamanthandel (1904), the Fortunia (1910) and the Vereniging voor 
Vrije Diamanthandel (1911) were founded as so-called diamond bourses allowing the trade of 
diamonds to be carried out in an adequate manner (LAUREYS 2005, 84ff.; KINSBERGEN 1984, 
94ff).5 Furthermore, in the 1930s different vocational schools with special foci on polishing 
were established for apprentices and unemployed people in Antwerp and its surroundings 
(LAUREYS 2005, 62f.). Last but not least, the sector was granted credit through specialised 
diamond banks such as the Comptoir Diamantaire Anversois S.A.6 resp. the Amsterdamsche 
Bank voor Belgie in 1934, both of them having an exclusive focus on the diamond sector 
(ADB 2008; LAUREYS 2005, 76f.). The continuous progress of the industry since the waning 
years of the 19th century is reflected in a growing number of employees: In 1908 there were 
around 66 working benches with 1.184 polishing wheels and around 1,500 employees in the 
district. During World War I the supply of rough was interrupted due to the occupation of the 
city. In 1920, however, the number of diamond workers in the Antwerp region amounted to 
approximately 20.000 workers, and in 1929 to about 27.000. When import prices rose due to 
the devaluation of the Franc in 1935, so did unemployment. The Great Depression of the thir-
ties, however, resulted in a tangible, albeit temporary impact on the diamond industry. It was 
not unusual for polishing shops to close for several weeks in these days. In 1937 the number 
of workers fell to 13.312 while as a result of immigration waves just before the German occu-
pation in 1940 there were about 23-25.000 diamond workers as well as 2.000 manufacturers, 
                                                 
5  Originally the trading took place in cafés close to the Antwerp central railway station (LAUREYS 2005, 58). 
6  Since 1937 Banque Diamantaire Anversoise S.A., also known as Antwerpse Diamantbank ".V. and Antwerp 
Diamond Bank N.V. 
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4.000 traders and 400 brokers in the district. Due to some overlaps, however, about 15.000 
people can be assumed to be dependent on the diamond sector as a whole. Antwerp at this 
time accounted for cutting about 80 % of the world’s diamonds (measured by value) 
(LAUREYS 2005, 48ff., 131ff.).  
From a geographical point of view it should be stressed here that in these days the sector was 
centred around Antwerp with the strongest concentration in a small area close to the Antwerp 
main station. While larger stones were cut in the city, too, for different reasons its surround-
ings (so-called Kempen) since the turn of the century had become home to the fabricants of 
smaller stones (KINSBERGEN 1984, 138f.). Given the spatial concentration of specialised eco-
nomic actors and activities, the cluster term can be applied here, though in view of the fact 
that both trade and processing were in the hands of tightly interconnected family owned busi-
nesses the notion of a “diamond district” following the works on industrial districts (MAR-
KUSEN 1996; MARSHALL 1920) seems even more apt.7 
For understanding the further course of the cluster trajectory it must not be unmentioned here 
that the development of the diamond sector has been closely connected with the local Jewish 
community since its beginnings (VERBRAECK 2008; VANDEN DAELEN 2006a, b; LAUREYS 
2005, 48ff.).8,9 There are, however, differences depending on whether the trade or the process-
ing of diamonds is considered: While 80-90 % of the bourse members were immigrated Jews, 
the largest share of the workers (estimated 80 %) was traditional of Flemish origin (LAUREYS 
2005 48ff.; KINSBERGEN 1984, 104). Due to the strong Jewish influence in the sector, specific 
institutions were created in the course of time which are still relevant to the industry today: 
For instance, even though second generation immigrants mostly adopted the French language, 
Yiddish was to have some influence in the diamond district as indicated by the expression 
mazl un brokhe (good luck and blessing) which is still used when a deal is closed (VANDEN 
DAELEN 2006a, 3). Moreover, working rhythms are adapted to the Jewish calendar (the luach) 
and they are acknowledge by non-Jewish traders as well (for example the diamond bourses 
are still closed on Jewish holidays like Yom Kippur).10  
 
6 The $azi rule and the end of the trajectory 
The looming war and the invasion of German troops into Belgium in May 1940 brought about 
some confusion into the Antwerp diamond world. While at first there were some uncertainties 
whether to stay in Belgium or to move abroad, it was finally decided to relocate the industry 
                                                 
7  However, industrial districts can be regarded as a special type of regional clusters (STERNBERG/LITZEN-
BERGER 2004, 768; KOSCHATZKY 2001, 200).  
8  See also the document prepared by E. Schmidt in the Brachfeld Archive (BE SA 7537). 
9  VANDEN DAELEN (2006a, 2) lists several reasons for explaining the Jewish engagement in the diamond in-
dustry (for a more theoretical consideration see RICHMAN 2006): First, as immigrants, Jews often were look-
ing for professions that did not require intensive trainings. Furthermore, they preferred jobs allowing for an 
adaptation of their working rhythms to their religious practices. In fact, a closer analysis of the Jodenregister 
(Registry of Jews) dated 1940 shows that most of the Jews had worked as diamond cutters (40.7 %). In other 
words, jobs that easily could be carried out in a very flexible way at home or in small workshops allowed for 
the practice of religious rituals. 
10  Traditionally, and mostly after World War I, established diamond dealers expressed themselves in French 
which was also the dominant language in the diamond bourses whilst Jewish diamond people of Dutch origin 
sticked to Dutch. Recent immigrants or less educated diamond workers however, still spoke Yiddish which 
they had spoken in Eastern Europe (TEITELBAUM-HIRSCH 2001, 42; Interview with David Urlik, former 
president of the Vrije Diamanthandel, Antwerpen, 26 March 2002; Interview with Nathan Ramet, Member of 
the board of the Diamantclub van Antwerpen, Chairman of the Museum for Deportation and Resistance in 
Malines, 1 October 2008). 
- 9 - 
in Cognac, France.11 In fact, around 5.000 people, most of them Jews, moved there (LAUREYS 
2005, 158). For different reasons however, the establishment of the refugees in France proved 
difficult. As a consequence a new escape wave set in resulting in two types of refugees. A 
first group moved overseas mainly to the UK, the USA, Cuba, South Africa, Brazil and Pales-
tine (LAUREYS 2005, 163ff.; 2003a, 181ff.) and started new businesses there. These refugees 
often benefited from support from relatives and friends of the Jewish Diaspora. A second 
group decided to go back to Antwerp, the more so as many of them were persuaded to do so 
by the German occupants.12 It has to be mentioned, however, that not all diamond people had 
fled. Indeed, most of the fabricants and workers of Belgian origin had stayed in Belgium hop-
ing that the Germans would allow their activities to be continued (LAUREYS 2005, 163ff.).  
All diamond people, whether they had stayed in Antwerp or returned from France were soon 
put under German military control. Shortly after that, several measures taken by the Germans 
not only led to a reorganisation of the sector but resulted in a complete discontinuation of the 
commercial activities in 1942 (LAUREYS 2005, 224ff.; 2003b). First, intermediaries like bro-
kers were excluded because their business was not only regarded to be clearly Jewish but also 
to contribute to price increases. Second, only people who had been active in the diamond 
trade for at least ten years were allowed to continue their activities.13 Third, in 1941 organised 
raids were carried out in two of the diamond bourses by the Devisenschutzkommando and the 
Sipo-SD (see also VANDEN DAELEN 2006b, 104f.). Fourth, the traders’ stocks were confis-
cated in three stages. Fifth, the Germans removed about 2.500 workbenches from the largest 
10 companies while smaller machinery for about 10.000 workers were left untouched (The 
New York Times, 11.09.1944; 07.09.1944). Moreover, large numbers of qualified workers 
were deported to Germany for compulsory labour. The measures by the Nazis culminated in 
the deportation of nearly 65 % of the Antwerp Jewish population to the concentration camps, 
among them 984 diamond people as a closer analysis of the deportation reveals. Given the 
fact that in addition many people died due to enemy actions all in all it can be assumed that 40 
percent of the city’s diamond dealers and about 15 % of the workers were killed during the 
war (The New York Times, 27.03.1960). 
The gradual reduction of the trading activities alluded to ??? above is well illustrated by the 
decrease of the number of members of the bourses: In 1941, 1.533 members were registered 
at the Diamantclub, the most important diamond bourse in Antwerp in those days; in 1944 
only 339 were left. At the same time, however, the number of absent members rose from 0 to 
1.159 (see table 1). The number of members of the Beurs voor Diamanthandel decreased 
from 1.654 in 1939 to 355 in 1945 (BEURS VOOR DIAMANTHANDEL 1979, 27). Despite miss-
ing data it can be assumed that, except for Fortunia which did not have any Jewish members, 
the other bourses met the same fate. 
                                                 
11  Cognac was (among other things) chosen as a location because it was assumed that the German armies would 
not advance in much the same way they did in WW I – a surrender of France had not been expected. Fur-
thermore, it can be assumed that the peripheral town was only selected as a refuge because a cosmopolitan 
and wealthy group of Jewish diamantaires would not settle there indefinitely, thus increasing the probability 
of their return to Antwerp (LAUREYS 2005, 156; JACK 1941, 112). 
12  The Germans at first were interested in keeping the Antwerp diamond industry alive for several reasons: On 
the one hand, diamond export provided a hard currency which was needed to import raw materials into Ger-
many; on the other hand, industrial diamonds had a high strategic value. As LAUREYS (2003b, 59ff.) points 
out that, being well aware that the diamond industry was in Jewish hands to a large extend, the Germans did 
not push for anti-Jewish measures at the beginning of the occupation but tried to recover the stocks the refu-
gees had taken with them. This “friendly” behaviour of the Germans, however, changed around 1941 when 
stocks were consigned by the Germans. As the USA entered the war and hopes for more diamond dealers to 
return to Antwerp dwindled, the Germans started considering the implementation of a “final solution to the 
Jewish problem” in the diamond industry as well. 
13  As many Jews had arrived in the 1930s this step clearly can be regarded as an anti-Jewish measure, too 
(LAUREYS 2003b, 63). 
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Table 1: Members of the Diamantclub (1941-1944) 
 
 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Number of 
Members 
1.533 699 683 339 
Number of 
Members abroad 
0 822 1.161 1.159 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Antwerp City Archive, BA0041. 
 
The diamond processing industry also suffered under the German occupation, however in a 
rather indirect way: The allies did not want the Nazi regime to take possession of diamonds 
which were of strategic importance to the war industry and thus had ceased the supply of raw 
diamonds to foreign countries immediately after the German attack on Poland in 1939 (see 
also JACK 1941, 111f.). Due to the lack of rough stones to be polished the industry gradually 
wasted away: From 15.000 workers being active in the sector in 1940, only 2.000 remained in 
March 1941 resp. 1.000 in July 1940. A mandatory diamond deposit eventually hailed the end 
of the industrial activities, too (LAUREYS 2005, 236).  
 
7 Shifting centres 
Many of the refugees had left Belgium with their stocks trying to resume their activities over-
seas both in diamond trade and processing. In addition, the rise of the new diamond centres 
was encouraged by the gradual fading-away of their former main competitor Antwerp due to 
the reasons mentioned above. Both aspects imply that a new window of locational opportunity 
had opened making the industry pass through a development that resembles the stage of 
“shifting centres” as suggested by STORPER/WALKER (1989). To be precise, the refugees 
mainly were attracted to two locations (see Table 2): In the United States where many dia-
mond dealers emigrated, the number of diamond workers rose from 350 (pre-war) to 4.000 in 
1945. Up to 70-80 % of the world diamond production was to be found there after the war.14 
The share of sales even rose from approx. 75 % (pre-war) to 85 % in 1948. At least the pol-
ishing industry in Palestine (after 1948 Israel) – the destination of many Zionist Jews hoping 
to contribute to the emerging Jewish state – experienced a similar development with the num-
ber of enterprises rising from 4 in 1939 to 45 in 1947 (SZENBERG 1973, 20). Similarly, the 
number of polishers increased from 200 just before to about 3.800 after WW II and to ap-
proximately 8.000 in 196515. Finally, the UK gained in importance, too: On the one hand, it 
became home to some industrial activities; on the other hand, the Correspondence Office for 
the Diamond Industry (COFDI) was established in London by the Antwerp mayor Camille 
Huysmans and the prominent diamantaires Romi Goldmuntz and Herman Schamisso in Octo-
ber 1940 to support the former Antwerp diamond community during the war (for example by 
returning diamonds to refugees that had been confiscated by different states) (LAUREYS 2005, 
164f.). 
 
                                                 
14  However, data concerning the exact number of diamond workers are inconsistent. One source, for example, 
points out, that in 1948 there were about 3.500 diamond cutters (The New York Times, 09.05.1948), while 
another one assumes about 800 diamond workers for the same year (SZENBERG 1973, 20). 
15  Volksgazet, 25.02.1965. 
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Table 2: $umber of diamond workers by country before the war and in 1945 
 
  Pre-war 1945 
USA (without Puerto Rico) 350 4.000 
South Africa 150 600 
Brazil --- 4 
Cuba --- 2 
Canada --- 300 
UK 10 750 
Puerto Rico --- 1,5 
Palestine / Israel (since 1948) 200 3.800 
 
Source: Antwerp City Archive, letter from Romi Goldmuntz to Camille Huysmans, 
25/08/1945 concerning the activities of COFDI (MA-KAB 1723). 
 
8 Closing the window by strategic action 
Yet before the war was over it was assumed that Antwerp would soon recover as a major trad-
ing hub, not only because tools and machinery were expected to be reinstalled quickly but 
also because of the “big potential demand for Antwerp types of cut gems” (The New York 
Times, 11.09.1944), i. e. smaller stones (so-called Melee) that could not be worked upon in 
New York for the labour costs were too high (JACK 1941, 112).16 This, however, is only one 
part of the story. Rather, as will be outlined in the following, strategic actions taken by a few 
key actors who were involved or closely connected to the diamond business and provided 
strongly needed resource (diamonds, tools and labour) were most relevant for the continuation 
of the pre-war structures and the closure of the window of locational opportunity that was 
open at this time. 
 
8.1 Generating advantages on the supply side 
The evolution of the new growth centres was a major threat to the re-emergence of the Ant-
werp diamond district that was desired not only by some Belgian policy makers but also by 
people from the diamond sector. For this reason COFDI had started looking for a solution 
thereby taking some particularities of the sector into account: Since the late 19th century the 
diamond industry had been characterised by cartel structures. By merging different smaller 
South African companies the “De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.” was founded in March 
1888 controlling a vast share of the produced rough diamonds (the evolution of the diamond 
cartel is subject to many publications – see for example CAMPBELL 2003, 99ff.; CARSTENS 
2001 – and therefore will only be outlined here). By-and-by the company managed to acquire 
different mines which started selling their stones to a London based de Beers subsidiary 
known as the Diamond Corporation Ltd (Dicorp). De Beers also managed to persuade outside 
                                                 
16  At the same time, however, it was feared that Antwerp would relieve the wartime shortage of smaller gems 
thus contributing to a fall of the prices for larger stones as well (The New York Times, 07.09.1944; see also 
The New York Times, 11.09.1944). Given the shortage of diamonds and diamond workers outside Europe, 
the supply of diamonds was greatly restricted in the period between 1940 and 1945. As a consequence prices 
had risen strongly. By taking up activities in Belgium again, it was assumed that the costs for cutting and pol-
ishing would decrease. In any case it could be expected that the supply of diamonds would increase and 
prices would fall (The Times, 10.10.1944). 
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diamond mining companies to sell their production via Dicorp, thus sparing them the estab-
lishment of an expensive distribution system. As a consequence, the company gained control 
over about 80 to 85 percent of the world’s production of rough diamonds.17 Besides that, De 
Beers also centralised the distribution of raw diamonds through a unique system (effective 
until 1979): Approximately ten times a year, the Diamond Trading Company Ltd., a sister 
company of Dicorp, organised so-called sights in London (UK), Lucerne (Switzerland) and 
Kimberley (South Africa) where a certain amount of diamonds was offered at a fixed price 
(approximately 75 % of the market wholesale price) to only a small number of exclusive buy-
ers (so-called sightholders) who had proven to be financially stable and loyal. Once a 
sightholder would not agree with the offer he was not invited again (LEGRAND 1991, 188f.; 
KINSBERGEN 1984, 68ff.).18  
Given De Beers’ control over the distribution of rough diamonds, it was obviously important 
to convince the company to favour Antwerp’s rough supply if the city was to regain its com-
petitive edge. Three factors actually persuaded De Beers to do so: The relevance of diamonds 
mined in the Congo, the renewal of a supply contract between the company mining the stones 
in Congo and the desire of the Dicorp not to lose its influence on the market action. 
During the war, approximately 80 % of the world’s raw diamonds were extracted in the 
Congo which at the time was a Belgian colony. The majority of the stones were industrial 
grade (KINSBERGEN 1984, 45f.). The mining was carried out by the Forminière company (So-
ciété Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo) with the Belgian government being its 
main shareholder. Forminière distributed its production through De Beers’ London operation, 
based on a contract dated 1926 (LAUREYS 2005, 40, 71ff.). In 1942 this contract had to be 
renewed. The Belgian government was very keen on the restoration of the diamond district 
once the war was over – it had accounted for 6 % of Belgian export before 1940 – and suc-
cessfully negotiated the inclusion of a clause into the new contract specifying that large 
amount of cuttable raw diamonds should be reserved for the post-war diamond industry in 
Belgium. This matter had been brought to the Belgian government’s attention thanks to 
COFDI’s relentless lobbying. In return, Forminière committed to supply the allies at advanta-
geous prices hoping that this might stimulate a continued demand for industrial diamonds 
after the war. Last but not least, the mentioned measures only were possible as De Beers was 
interested in a long-term binding of Forminière in order to keep its influence on the diamond 
market. As a consequence, the cartel was willing to compromise with its contractual partners 
(LAUREYS 2005, 285ff.). 
In addition to these measures being highly important as a kind of initial spark19 for the re-
emergence of the district, COFDI also succeeded in convincing De Beers to reduce or even 
stop the rough supply (LAUREYS 2005, 300) to Brazil, Mexico and Cuba – where only well 
established companies would be supplied. In addition, the supply of Palestine and to India 
was temporarily ceased for strategic reasons: It was feared that the enemy could get a hold of 
the stones through Palestine-Syria-Turkey resp. India-Japan (ibid.; JACK 1941, 111f.). All in 
all it becomes apparent, that through its strategic action, COFDI was able to contribute to 
closing the window of locational opportunity by securing a brilliant post-war position for 
Antwerp in terms of supply and thus outnumbering the other centres. 
                                                 
17  The rest of the production was sold by the mining countries which benefited from the stability of the market 
(LEGRAND 1991, 188). 
18  According to LAUREYS (2005, 40) shortly before the war about 300 sightholders were specialised jewellery 
diamonds and 30 in industrial diamonds. 
19  Though different files (e. g. MA-KAB 1723, summary of the Recovery of the Belgian diamond industry) 
point out, that the first deliveries from London were not sufficient – neither in quantity nor in quality (see 
also LAUREYS 2006, 378) – they actually were of great importance because they generated thousands of jobs 
(VANDEN DAELEN 2006b, 113) (see also the next chapter). 
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8.2 Recovery of labour 
The worldwide dispersal of the diamantaires from Antwerp was regarded as another major 
problem in view of the potential attempt at resuscitation of the cluster structures. Against this 
background, yet during the war COFDI started to encourage the return of the fugitives 
through material and psychological incentives. Already in 1941 Goldmuntz and Huysmans 
had tried to convince the London based Belgian government in exile to contact different or-
ganisations related to the diamond industry, especially the ones located in New York in order 
to trigger a friendly attitude towards Antwerp. In addition, the organisation implemented sev-
eral measures aiming at a quick recovery of labour after the war. In principal, they can be 
classified in two categories: The first one consists of general reparation measures such as the 
granting of transport benefits, the Belgian nationality, visas and the compensation for war 
damages. Personal assets were repatriated, apartments and furniture were resituated to the pre-
war owners. Not unimportantly, the fight against anti-Semitism was of particular concern to 
Belgian and Antwerp authorities, too. The second category of measures was meant to rekindle 
business activities in the diamond sector: supply of rough stones, fiscal and financial advan-
tages and support from the authorities when establishing business contacts. While at first the 
refugees tended to reject any thought of going back, many of them changed their minds with 
the first allied military successes in 1942 and with COFDI having successfully achieved to 
restrict the rough supply to the new centres (see above). All in all, however, convincing the 
diamond people to come back must be considered as one of the hardest challenges with regard 
to the recovery of the former structures (VANDEN DAELEN 2006b, 108ff.). 
Though most of the measures referred to emigrants in the US (VANDEN DAELEN (2006b, 112) 
consulting the foreigner files for the period between 1948 and 1965 suggest that they might 
also have attracted people from other countries: Map 1 shows that the vast majority of the 
diamond workers coming to Antwerp in fact returned from those states having experienced 
the strongest immigration before, with the US and Israel but also France and the UK being 
most relevant.20 Another important aspect is that according to the files many of the returning 
diamantaires were born in the Southern Carpathian region and – regarding their names – can 
(with caution) be considered Jews. It can be assumed that the above mentioned pull-factors 
(chapter 6) were effective as a kind of subsidiary factor for them: In many cases, an entry into 
the sector was rendered possible by different features of the district in these days. First, nei-
ther diploma nor any other certificates were required for a job in the diamond industry. Sec-
ond, in many cases Jews took on jobs in sectors with limited government control for they of-
ten had temporary or no work permits. Actually the Belgian government adopted a very lib-
eral attitude towards the diamond business and there were not as many formal rules as in other 
trades (VANDEN DAELEN 2006a, 2). This also allowed new immigrants to take up just a tem-
porary profession in the diamond trade to get around until they left by ship for relatives in the 
US.  
 
                                                 
20  Comparing the Jodenregister with the immigration files, however, it becomes obvious that only a minor part 
of the pre-war Jews actually returned to Antwerp. To be exact, only 32 persons could be identified as having 
lived in Antwerp before WW II and having immigrated after 1948. This number, however, for several rea-
sons may be lower than the actual number: First, the immigration files only start in 1948 so that people who 
were repatriated between 1944 and 1948 could not be accounted for. Second, people may have gained Bel-
gian nationality in a municipality outside Antwerp and thus were not registered as immigrants to the city. 
Third, people might not have registered in Antwerp but in a different municipality. 
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Map 1: Migrants to the Antwerp diamond district by Provenance (1948-1965) 
 
Source: Own depiction based on the analysis of immigration files of the city archive of Ant-
werp (N=1,186). 
 
8.3 Chance and other factors 
Besides the COFDI-initiatives, emotional aspects (“homesickness”) surely may have made 
some people come back to where they had lived before, too.21 Furthermore, the migration to 
the district was favoured by factors that could not be influenced by the local actors. In a sense, 
these aspects could be termed as “chance”: According to VANDEN DAELEN (2006b, 114) the 
sector experienced a considerable growth after the first deliveries of stones, mainly triggered 
by the resumption of exports to the US. This, in fact, convinced some refugees to return. 
Moreover, during the Korean War (1950-1953) the United States were interested in the com-
pilation of a strategic stockpile. Some Antwerp diamantaires succeeded in towing this market 
to them which resulted in a massive influx of capital to the city and thus attracted other dia-
mond dealers to the location as well (LAUREYS 2005, 378). A different development was of 
importance in these years, too: Since the 1950s the Dutch diamond district, a traditional com-
petitor to Antwerp, had been struggling. Efforts were made to restart the industry and an in-
ternational consulting company was commissioned to analyse and suggest ways to improve 
the local quality and production. This in turn resulted in a strike in 1954 marking the final 
curtain of the Dutch diamond industry and encouraging many of its employees to move to 
Antwerp (Interview with Hans Wins, former De Beers PR manager in Antwerp, 16.04.2008). 
In fact, the analysis of the immigration files suggests that 9 % of the 1.186 identified diamond 
people moving to Antwerp in the period between 1948 and 1965 came from the Netherlands. 
Finally, the re-emergence of the structure was facilitated by the availability of parts of the 
former cluster know-how resp. infrastructure as well as by supporting factors external to the 
                                                 
21  One diamond-finisher quoted in the Sunday Express from October 1st, 1944, said: “One thing we don’t like – 
the Welsh Sunday. Nothing to do but sit and think of the Continental Sunday, with all the pubs, cinemas, 
theatres and other places open to give people full enjoyment on their one full day free from work”. 
- 15 - 
local actors but acting in the same line: In fact many of the diamond workers were of autoch-
thonous Flemish origin and thus had not been persecuted during the war. In other words: The 
knowledge how to cut and polish a diamond was still to be found in the region. In addition, 
although some of the machines had been taken away by the occupants, most of the infrastruc-
ture was still available thus facilitating a recovery of the pre-war-activities. In the end, the 
above mentioned immigration of Jews to Antwerp was facilitated by another aspect: Due to 
some new anti-Semitic actions many Jews, especially from Poland but also from Russia and 
Czechoslovakia fled from their countries to Belgium which was known for the liberal attitude 
of its government. Many of them started as unskilled workers cleaving the stones (Interview 
with Hans Wins, 16.04.2008; Interview with Yvan Verbraeck, long-time editorial journalist 
for the Syndikaat der Belgische Diamantnijverheid, 2008). 
All in all, together with the COFDI initiatives the mentioned aspects resulted in a “selective 
clustering” as reflected in the number of diamond workers: On April 1st 1945, there were 
3.480 cleavers, cutters and polishers, in May 1946 their number had grown to considerable 
13.570 (KINSBERGEN 1984, 105). 
 
9 Conclusion 
While Antwerp for a long time had been a prospering diamond centre, different measures 
taken by the German military administration led to a complete discontinuation of all activities 
related to the sector in 1942. Many of the diamantaires who were able to flee started new 
businesses abroad heralding a stage of shifting centres. The development of these new loca-
tions, however, was restricted by different measures mainly initiated by some actors from the 
former district in Antwerp. Some aspects deserve closer consideration in this context: 
First, the outlined actions were carried out by only a few sector related actors whether they 
were business people like the diamantaires Romi Goldmuntz and Herman Schamisso, repre-
sentatives of the colonial diamond extraction company Forminière or politicians like Camille 
Huysmans. Here we find convergence with other studies implying the high relevance of key 
persons in the process of the evolution of regional clusters (see for example ZUCKER et al. 
1998 for the impact of key scientists on the emergence of clusters). The success of the above 
mentioned people was primarily due to their monetary power (financing of COFDI and its 
initiatives) but also due to their power and influence based on their relations (to the Belgian 
Government, to De Beers but also to the diamond diaspora).22 In this context it should not be 
hidden that some actors may also have benefited individually from their actions.23  
Second, it seems obvious that the mentioned measures were only taken because the actors in 
question were convinced of the fact that the rupture was not only of temporary nature but 
would eventually allow for a quick recovery of the former structures. In other words: Though 
not verifiable it is hard to imagine that similar steps would have been taken if the respective 
actors had expected the Nazi rule to last for a longer time. This line of reasoning is partly re-
flected in the evacuation of the diamond people to Cognac which was believed to be only a 
temporary hideaway. 
Third, since the diamond sector was of great importance to the Belgian pre-war economy, 
strategic actions by the business people were explicitly supported by decision makers in gov-
ernment who hoped to contribute to a quick recovery of the industry in order to create new 
                                                 
22  See MOSSIG (2006, 92f.) for different concepts of power. 
23  Camille Huysmans, for example, had been mayor of Antwerp between 1933 and 1940. Given the fact that 
several thousand people were dependent on the local diamond industry at this time it can be assumed that as-
pects like the maximisation of votes and the recovery of political positions after the next elections influenced 
his course of action. 
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opportunities for income and employment. This not only highlights the relevance of policy 
support when trying to revive cluster structures but also suggests that the new trajectory in a 
way can be regarded as an expansion of the former successful path. 
It would be wrong, however, to consider only strategic action as a factor leading to the re-
emergence of the former structures. Obviously, this process should rather be attributed to a 
mixture of both strategic action and “accidental” events that could not be influenced by local 
actors but were nevertheless related to the further developments (see also MEYER/SCHUBERT 
2007). For instance, as explained above, the growth of the cluster structures in Antwerp was 
also facilitated by the Korean War, resp. the demise of the Amsterdam diamond industry as 
well as anti-Semitic sentiments in Eastern Europe – aspects that were out of reach to the local 
actors but actually had a deep impact on the further development of the sector. In general, this 
suggests that chance should be regarded as a factor opening up certain “spaces” for strategic 
actions (like the renewal of the contract between Forminière and De Beers suggests). 
Detaching the study from the context of the Antwerp diamond district the results show that 
the re-emergence of regional clusters should not only be regarded as a mere outcome of 
chance aspects but that strategic considerations of different actors should be interpreted as 
triggering factors that might be able to lead to an early closure of potential windows of oppor-
tunity. All in all these findings ask for a deeper consideration of the micro-processes (human 
actions) underlying the (re-)emergence of regional clusters instead of only focussing on 
macro-economic factors, certain regional features or sector statistics. To prove the relevance 
of human actions, further research on the re-emergence of spatial structures is necessary (e. g. 
the airship industry in Friedrichshafen, Germany). Furthermore, though it seems possible to 
generate cluster structures intentionally (see for example the case of Sophia Antipolis; see 
MENZEL 2008), evidence suggests that the development of a cluster is likely to fail when only 
based on purposeful action (FELDMAN/FRANCIS 2004 or ORSENIGO 2001). This raises the 
question whether strategic action is important for the re-emergence of regional clusters whilst 
the initial evolution of a cluster is mainly determined by different factors. 
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